Peace to Karabakh. Russia’s Mediation in the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

In Place of Introduction
Abbreviations Used in This Book

PART ONE TOUCHES OF REMINISCENCES

Why?
Prologue
The First Encounter and Early Contacts With Heydar Aliyev
Karabakh at the 28th Congress of the CPSU
In a ‘Prep School’
The ‘Illegitimate’ CSCE Minsk Group
The First Steps of the Minsk Group
Baku – Nakhichevan
A Face-to-Face Meeting in Moscow (August 7–8, 1992)
A Fit of the Blues: Was the Minsk Group Created for the Sake of the Settlement or Vice Versa?
The Early 1993
Heydar Aliyev – In Moscow Again
The Russia-Turkey Initiative and Its Collapse
The First Thing to be Achieved is Limitation of Hostilities
With Heydar Aliyev – Finally in Baku
Ambassadors, too, have Occupational Diseases
The Fall of Agdam
Direct Contacts between Baku and Stepanakert
Three Messages for Boris Yeltsin
The Shocks of the Autumn
Three Confessions by Phone
A Border Incident of November 20, 1993
The Stories Spinned Over That Incident and Who Spinned Them
The Remote Flank of the Karabakh Front
Yerevan’s Version and a Bit of Logic at Least
The Shady Deal of December 1993
The Bishkek Protocol
The Signing of the Protocol in Baku
Baku – Moscow, May 9–11
12 May – A Breakthrough on the Path to Peace in Karabakh
Necessity Truly is the Mother of Invention
Benefits and Flaws of the 1994 Ceasefire
Moscow Meeting of the Defence Ministers
Consolidation of the Armistice: Fantasies vs Reality
Some Are Not Too Happy With the Armistice Either
The Role of Russia’s Mediatory in Achieving the Ceasefire
Our Western Partners are into Schemes
The Uproar Among Our Western Partners
And Something Else About the Neutrals
Karabakh Peace Efforts at Yevgeni Primakov’s Time
A Preliminary Summary

PART TWO HIS MAJESTY THE ARGUMENT

There Is No Dispensing With Mediators (1994)
Russia and the CSCE Minsk Group (1994)
Speech About the Mandate of the Minsk Group Delivered at the Meeting of the CSCE Permanent Committee (1994)
To the Chairman of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh held under the CSCE aegis Mr Jan Eliasson (1994)
The CIS Contribution to Putting an End to the Karabakh Bloodshed (2000)
Letter to OSCE Secretary-General Ján Kubiš (2003)
Azerbaijan and the UN Security Council resolutions (reviewing the Lessons of the Past in the Karabakh Conflict) (2004)
Letter to PACE Rapporteur on Nagorno-Karabakh David Atkinson (2004)
Nagorno-Karabakh Must Take Part in Negotiations
Who Sought a Military Solution to the Karabakh Conflict
Open Letter to the OSCE Chair-in-Office Dimitry Rupel
People’s Diplomacy must get a New Lease on Life!
People’s Diplomacy is to Be Kept on a Leash!
Signing is Half of the Matter. Implement!
Too Much Ambiguity and Deceit Surrounding the Karabakh Conflict
Two Helsinki Principles and an ‘Atlas of Conflicts’
Is There A Way Out of the Karabakh Deadlock?
An Important Document or Just a Regular?
High-level Signature, albeit a ‘Double-bottomed’ One
Russia, OSCE and the Karabakh Conflict (15th anniversary of the ceasefire in Karabakh)

APPENDIXES

The Principal International Documents Concerned With the Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Documents Related to Russia’s Mediatory Efforts and Direct Contacts Between Baku and Stepanakert
Timeline of Russia’s Mediatory Efforts in the Framework of the Peaceful Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict